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讲座主题:Information transparency in the assembly system under pull and push contracts

讲座时间: 2019年11月23日(周六)上午9:00

讲座地点:南教4-324室

主讲嘉宾:李果

主要讲授对象:经管学科研究生

主讲嘉宾简介:

李果,北京理工大学管理与经济学院教授,博士生导师,长期从事供应链与物流管理、运作管理方面的教学研究工作,担任International Journal of Advanced Pervasive and Ubiquitous Computing副主编、中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会工业工程专业委员会理事和中国自动化学会经济与管理系统专业委员会委员等,目前受邀担任UTD24顶级期刊Production and Operations Management的Editorial Review Board Member,运作管理领域国际知名期刊Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review和Annals of Operations Research的Managing guest editor,长期担任Production and Operations Management、Omega、Annals of Operations Research、European Journal of Operational Research、International Journal of Production Economic等30余个SCI/SSCI刊源的审稿人,累计发表论文50余篇,出版专著2部,其中以第一作者或通讯作者在专业领域内顶级/重要SCI/SSCI期刊Journal of Operations Management、Decision Sciences、European Journal of Operational Research、Annals of Operations Research、International Journal of Production Economics、International Journal of Production Research、Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review、IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics、Journal of the Operational Research Society和International Transactions in Operational Research等上发表论文40余篇。2013年入选“北京市高等学校青年英才计划”,获第三届北京市大学生物流设计大赛优秀指导教师奖。

讲座内容简介:

   This paper investigates the strategic impact of suppliers' product cost information sharing on the firms’ equilibrium pricing and production strategies in a decentralized assembly system, in which two independent suppliers produce complementary components to a single downstream assembler. The suppliers' production cost could exhibit two values: a high production cost and a low production cost, and each supplier privately observe her own production cost but remains uncertain about the other's information. We specifically consider four different scenarios, depending on whether the pull contract or the push contract is adopted in the assembly system and whether the product cost information is shared among the firms or not. We show that the firms’ equilibrium strategies and payoffs vary significantly under different scenarios.

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研究生部  经济与管理学院

2019年11月21日