关键词: 演化博弈, 航空物流, 政府补贴

Abstract:  Building a collaborative, stable, and efficient air logistics service chain is one of the important aspects of pro鄄 moting high-quality development of air logistics. Government subsidy policies help to enrich the air transport network and improve cargo and mail throughput. At present, subsidy policies implemented by many local gov鄄 ernments in China have achieved remarkable results, but the impacts of different subsidy scenarios on various participants in the air logistics service chain and their internal mechanisms remain unclear. A structural model of the air logistics service chain involving governments, airlines, airports, and freight forwarding enterprises is constructed, and evolutionary game analysis is carried out. According to actual subsidy practices, simulation is conducted to analyze the influence of relevant parameter changes on the behavioral decisions of each partici鄄 pant. The simulation results verify the accuracy of the model structure and evolutionary analysis calculation re鄄 sults, and prove that subsidy policies can effectively influence the decision-making of airlines and freight for鄄 warding enterprises to adjust regional route construction and boost cargo volume growth. The research shows that the decision -making changes of different participants exert differentiated impacts on the air logistics service chain. Airlines will only enter the market when government subsidies can cover the costs of opening new routes. Freight forwarding enterprises are more sensitive to changes in subsidy amounts. Finally, based on the premise of the long-term operation of the air logistics service chain, this paper puts forward relevant policy suggestions on the subsidy modes for the Chinese air logistics industry, aiming to provide a reference for the collaborative development of air logistics service chain

Key words: evolutionary game, air logistics, government subsidies